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Neo-liberal Governing of “Radicals”: Danish 
Radicalization Prevention Policies and Potential 
Iatrogenic Effects
Lasse Lindekilde, Department of Political Science, Aarhus University, Denmark
The Danish government’s counter-radicalization Action Plan of 2009 had intended and unintended effects. Primarily targeting Danish Muslims, it employs neo-
liberal governmentality approaches of governance through individual support and response, information and knowledge, empowerment, surveillance and inter-
vention, and anti-discrimination. It aims to prevent radicalization by transforming, shaping, and disciplining illiberal and violence-prone “radicals” into active, 
liberal citizens. Prolonged fieldwork and in-depth interviews with seventeen Muslims from a targeted milieu reveal skepticism about the effectiveness of the 
measures. Implementation of the action plan in practice may yield iatrogenic effects.
The concept of radicalization has become a central part of 
the political and academic vocabulary, especially in recent 
articulation and analysis of the threat from Islamist terror-
ism. The concept has, in particular, been linked to the 
question of “home-grown terrorism” in the West. Radical-
ization has become the main frame for understanding, ex-
plaining, and preventing young Muslims from engaging in 
radical activities. Although the concept is contested, the 
discourse of radicalization and theories of radicalization 
processes are gaining momentum in most European coun-
tries (Sedgwick 2010).
The popularity of the radicalization discourse is largely a 
product of the reconsideration of existing counter-
terrorism policies aimed at stopping terrorist attacks, es-
pecially following the Madrid and London bombings of 
2004 and 2005. These attacks refocused attention among 
policymakers, security agencies, and academics from “ex-
ternal security” to “internal security” (Bigo and Tsoukala 
2008), launching the concept of radicalization as the 
framework for understanding “home-grown terrorism”. In 
this new perspective, concern is increasingly directed to-
ward issues of integration, parallel communities, and illib-
eral attitudes of Muslim minorities in particular, as their 
lack of integration, social cohesion, and experience of mar-
ginalization are posited to provide a breeding ground for 
radicalization.
It is against this backdrop that radicalization prevention 
has developed as a new policy area in many European 
countries over the past five or six years. It is characteristic 
of the radicalization discourse, and of the new policy re-
gimes, that they mix a security agenda with an integration 
agenda, where security concerns and risk assessment be-
come closely intertwined with questions of integration, 
anti-discrimination, and social cohesion.
The discourse on radicalization has roots in security con-
cerns, but also concerns the wider debate on how Western 
liberal democracies should relate to, and integrate, especially 
Muslim minorities. Christian Joppke identifies a devel-
opment towards “repressive liberalism” within the fields of 
integration and immigration policy (2007), where Western 
European states are increasingly concerned with forming 
and letting in the right kind of liberal-democratic oriented 
people, creating as he puts it “liberal states for liberal people 
only” (Joppke 2007, 271). Joppke sees this trend as exemp-
lifying the flourishing of a Foucauldian disciplining form of 
neo-liberalism. He connects his thesis about the advance of 
repressive liberalism with the Foucauldian concept of gov-
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ernmentality, which constitutes a form of regulation that 
aims at “shaping behavior in congruence with particular 
sets of norms and with a certain goal” (Dean 1999, 15). 
Governmentality as a mode of regulation is characterized by 
the ambition to govern through individuals’ exercise of free 
choice, rather than direct control or prohibitions.
In the following I refer to the Danish government’s action 
plan of January 2009 for radicalization prevention – A 
Common and Safe Future – as an exemplary case of the 
formation of radicalization prevention as a new policy field 
and practice regime (Regeringen 2009). The purpose of the 
investigation is twofold. First, the article provides an over-
view of the content, intended effects, goals, and logics in-
herent to the action plan, via the analytical framework of 
governmentality developed by Mitchell Dean and Nikolas 
Rose (Dean 1999; Rose 1999). The purpose is to show how 
the prevention of radicalization in Denmark can be read 
partly as an extension of the repressive liberalism trend 
identified by Joppke. At the same time the perspective of 
governmentality provides a useful mold for debating the 
potential problems of targeting radicalization through a 
logic of governmentality and a commingling of security 
and integration concerns. Thus, the second part of the ar-
ticle examines whether the implementation of the action 
plan in practice may also yield iatrogenic effects.1 More 
precisely, the question investigated is if the neo-liberal in-
tention of preventing radicalization by shaping and creat-
ing liberal-democratic citizens may be counter-productive, 
and in the worst-case scenario contribute to the creation of 
oppositional, illiberal identities? Here the article argues, 
building on extensive interview- and fieldwork-based re-
search among young Muslims in Denmark, that at least 
three sets of unintended consequences may occur.2
Providing a definitive answer to the question of outcomes 
of radicalization prevention policies of the kind being im-
plemented in Denmark is beyond the scope of this article. 
Providing such an answer would mean conducting a 
 policy-effect study, measuring the level or scope of radical-
ization among target groups before and after the im-
plementation of policies, which would pose serious 
methodological challenges. Instead, this article takes a 
more indirect route of highlighting, first, the rationales be-
hind the intended outcomes of Danish radicalization pre-
vention policies and, second, theoretically and empirically 
possible mechanisms through which intended outcomes 
may be perverted in practice.
1. “A Common and Safe Future” – The Danish Government’s Action Plan to 
Prevent Radicalization Using a Governmentality Approach
In January 2008 the Danish government set up a working 
group of ministry officials tasked with developing an ac-
tion plan to prevent extremism and radicalization among 
young people. In January 2009, after a process of public 
consultation and dialogue on a draft version, the govern-
ment’s A Common and Safe Future action plan was 
launched, to provide a multifaceted approach to radical-
ization prevention, pinpointing seven main areas of inter-
vention with twenty-two concrete policy initiatives. The 
seven areas of intervention are: 1) direct contact with 
young people; 2) inclusion based on rights and obligations; 
3) dialogue and information; 4) democratic cohesion; 5) 
efforts in vulnerable residential areas; 6) special initiatives 
in prisons; and 7) knowledge, cooperation, and partner-
ships.
In the following analysis the policy document is treated as 
the central plank of a developing “practice regime of rad-
icalization prevention,” defined as the “more or less organ-
ized and routinized way in which we at a given time think, 
perform, and reform activities such as education, care, 
punishment, correction etc.” (Dean 1999, 30). The action 
plan constitutes the programmatic formulation of this new 
1  “Iatrogenic effects” is a term from medicine re-
ferring to unintentional adverse effects or compli-
cations caused by or resulting from medical treat-
ment or advice, but has also been used to refer to 
adverse effects of, for example, youth crime preven-
tion programs (see e.g. Dishion, McCord, and Pou-
lin 1999).
2 The study formed part of a large comparative 
study of radicalization processes among young Mus-
lims in Europe. In total thirty-nine interviews were 
carried out with young Muslims frequenting a par-
ticular Muslim milieu in the city of Aarhus in Den-
mark, religious authorities in the milieu, and social 
workers close to the young people in the milieu. The 
particular milieu was chosen because it in many 
ways constitutes the kind of neo-orthodox and sala-
fi-inspired environment that many authorities, and 
academics, worry about, rightfully or wrongfully, in 
terms of radicalization. For a detailed description of 
the study and its results see Kühle and Lindekilde 
2010 and Kühle and Lindekilde forthcoming.
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practice regime, while the practice regime of radicalization 
prevention itself is made up of the concrete programs, pol-
icy measures, actors, and institutions that are involved in 
implementing the action plan.
Dean argues that the analysis of a practice regime can be 
divided into four analytical dimensions. First, an import-
ant aspect of any practice regime is the framing of the 
problem to be tackled, and the solutions that follow from 
this. The second analytical dimension concerns the way 
governance of behavior is thought to function, the more or 
less implicit logics connecting orchestrated impulses, and 
their effects, and the different rationales of regulation be-
hind various concrete policy measures. The third dimen-
sion relates to the technical aspect of a practice regime, and 
deals with the programs, technologies, tactics, instruments, 
institutions, and procedures that are designed to im-
plement the concrete policy measures of a practice regime. 
Finally, the goal of governmentality as a form of regulation, 
which is engraved in the operation of neo-liberal practice 
regimes, is the fertilization of certain favorable identities or 
subject positions. This analytical dimension examines the 
identity formation the practice regime seeks to foster and 
the capacities, behavior, and attitudes that are supposed to 
accompany this transformation. The analysis of the Danish 
government’s action plan to prevent radicalization follows 
the four-dimensional analytical grid outlined above.
1.1. Radicalization Scenarios: Problem Definition and Solutions
The overall goal of the Danish government’s action plan is 
formulated in the preface as a wish to:
maintain and further develop Denmark as a democratic society 
with freedom, responsibility, equality and opportunities for all. 
Primarily, because it holds an independent value for society as 
well as for the individual, but also in order to weaken the growth 
basis for radicalization of young people and to strengthen socie-
ty’s resilience to extremism. (Regeringen 2009, 11)
It follows from this formulation that the problem of rad-
icalization and extremism is perceived as negatively cor-
related with individual experiences of freedom, 
responsibility, equal worth, and equal opportunities, so 
that the absence of such positive experience provides a po-
tential breeding ground for radicalization among young 
people. More precisely, the problem of radicalization and 
extremism is defined as follows:
Extremism is characterized by totalitarian and anti-democratic 
ideologies, intolerance to the views of others, hostile imagery 
and a division into ‘them’ and ‘us’. Extremist ideas may be ex-
pressed in different ways, and ultimately they may bring indivi-
duals or groups to use violent or undemocratic methods as a 
tool to reaching a specific political objective, or they may seek to 
undermine the democratic social order or make threats or carry 
out demeaning harassment against groups of people based on 
e.g. their skin colour, sexuality or beliefs.
Radicalization is the process in which a person gradually accepts 
the ideas and methods of extremism and, possibly, joins its orga-
nised groups. Personal circumstances, group dynamics as well as 
political, financial and cultural factors may all contribute to ra-
dicalization processes. (Regeringen, 2009, 8)
This two-fold definition of radicalization casts a certain 
light on the problem. First, it is worth noting that “ex-
tremism” is defined quite inclusively, making not only anti-
democratic or violent actions, but also undemocratic and 
intolerant ideas and attitudes defining elements of an “ex-
tremist” profile. This tendency to define extremism, and 
subsequent radicalization, as both a cognitive/ideological 
and a physical phenomenon is common in academic litera-
ture and government reports on radicalization across Eu-
rope (for discussion hereof see Kühle and Lindekilde 2010, 
24; Leuprect et al. 2010; Lambert 2011).
Secondly, radicalization is defined as the process of pro-
gressing internalization of extremist ideas. In this per-
spective radicalization becomes a more or less linear move 
away from a “normal” state of mind and action repertoire 
towards a “radical” outlook. In the academic literature on 
radicalization this processual perspective is dominant, 
often theorizing radicalization as following distinct phases 
(Silber and Bhatt 2007; Wiktorowicz 2005). Whether or not 
this processual understanding of radicalization is accurate 
is an empirical question. A growing literature suggests that 
it is not (Kühle and Lindekilde 2010; Olsen 2009; Staun 
2009). However, what is important here is that this under-
standing of radicalization stipulates and replicates certain 
“radicalization scenarios” rather than others (Schiffauer 
2008). In this perspective radicalization becomes likely 
when individuals are caught off balance, which can put 
them on a slippery slope from, for example, “moderate” 
IJCV : Vol. 6 (1) 2012, pp. 109 – 125
Lasse Lindekilde: Neo-liberal Governing of “Radicals” 113
Islam to “radical” Islam. Much academic literature and 
press coverage on radicalization among young Muslims in 
the West subscribes to such a radicalization scenario, where 
individuals’ involvement in “Islamist” or “Salafist” milieus 
is seen as an early phase of radicalization, which serves as a 
“conveyer belt” into violent jihadism (Hemmingsen and 
Andreasen 2007). It is held that radical entrepreneurs with-
in such neo-orthodox Muslim milieus are free to recruit for 
violence. It is obvious that subscribing to such a radical-
ization scenario leaves little room for seeing neo-orthodox, 
but non-violent, Muslim milieus as part of the solution 
rather than part of the problem.
Finally, as already indicated, the Danish government’s ac-
tion plan defines radicalization as an individual phenom-
enon. It is individuals, not groups that radicalize. This 
means that responsibility for radicalization falls upon the 
individual. He or she has a responsibility to avoid radical 
milieus and to become a well-functioning, liberal member 
of society.
In terms of solutions it is clear that the above-mentioned 
understanding of the problem of radicalization as cognitive 
and behavioral, processual and individual, points in certain 
directions. First of all, the conceptualization of radical-
ization as a linear process or slippery slope calls for early 
preventive measures to stop such processes from gaining 
momentum. The particular understanding of radical-
ization advanced in the government action plan makes pre-
ventive measures a natural solution. The action plan 
justifies the preventive focus in the following manner:
Through a direct, preventive effort it must be ensured that we as 
a society are prepared to identify and address specific problems 
related to extremism in a timely manner. Extremist propaganda 
should be met with factual information and alternative offers 
for the young people. An early, multi-stringed and coordinated 
preventive effort should counter the processes and influences 
that make certain young people turn their backs on society or 
be recruited into radical and extremist groups. (Regeringen 
2009, 11)
The logical response to radicalization processes is early in-
tervention and prevention. Furthermore, it follows from 
the understanding of the problem of radicalization as an 
individual, and both cognitive and behavioral phenom-
enon, that prevention strategies should be targeted at indi-
viduals, and should include a concern for both individuals’ 
behavior and their attitudes and opinions.
My argument is that this problem definition and solution 
orientation makes the state-sponsored fight against rad-
icalization and extremism very similar to the handling of 
other threats to individuals’ well-being, such as the fight 
against smoking and obesity. The approach to radical-
ization is also to attempt to reverse a negative development, 
to change behavior by influencing opinions and attitudes 
and offering alternative information and possibilities. 
Thus, the mode of regulation is one of neo-liberal govern-
mentality, where the individuals’ free choice is made the 
locus of change and regulation. Put differently, I argue that 
one of the main reasons for the popularity of the radical-
ization discourse today is the ease with which it can be 
fused with the logic of the dominant mode of neo-liberal 
government in Western societies. Looking at the concrete 
policy measures of the action plan, this logic of prevention 
through influencing and correcting extremist attitudes, and 
the provision of more progressive alternatives to radical 
milieus, is highly visible (see next section). This is also 
underlined by the absence of prohibitions in the action 
plan; radicalization is to be fought through influencing and 
shaping individuals who make the “right” liberal-
democratic choices on their own, rather than, for example, 
prohibiting extremist and radical groups. Security is ad-
vanced in society by facilitating integration and the devel-
opment of liberal citizens, and not so much by the control, 
surveillance, and repression of the older anti-terrorism 
practice regime.
1.2. Concrete Measures and Logics of Change
The many concrete policy measures in the Danish action 
plan can be categorized into groups based on which 
rationale of governance and logic of change they adhere to. 
What all the categories of governance share is that they try 
to govern through the individuals’ management of free-
dom; where they differ is in terms of how directly they try 
to affect individual choices. Some build on direct involve-
ment with adolescents, others try to obtain desired out-
comes through indirect effects, for example by imposing 
new roles and responsibilities on street-level bureaucrats 
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such as school teachers and social workers. I identity five 
rationales of governance in the action plan.3
1.2.1. Governance through Individual Support and Response
The first group of initiatives builds on the idea that rad-
icalization can be prevented if adolescents who show signs 
of “worrying behavior” are supported and challenged by 
other young people or adults who they respect and who 
hold more liberal-democratic values and identify more 
with mainstream society. The basic idea is that adolescents 
in the earliest phases of radicalization can be persuaded to 
change attitudes and behaviors in a more positive direc-
tion by interacting with others who hold different per-
spectives.
Two central policy measures in the Danish government 
action plan can be subsumed under this heading. First, we 
find the proposal of “Mentoring schemes focusing on 
young people and identity issues.” The mentoring 
schemes are currently under implementation in two 
model municipalities – Copenhagen and Aarhus – where 
corps of young mentors have been established and 
trained to make contact with adolescents in the target 
group, and understand radicalization processes and the 
meaning of identity building in such processes. The men-
tor-mentee relationship is voluntary, and no sanctions are 
applied if a potential mentee refuses to enter the program 
or leaves the program before completion. The mentors 
are thought of a as kind of task force, which can be called 
upon by street level bureaucrats who are in close contact 
with the young people (e.g., school teachers, youth 
workers, etc.), and who for various reasons are concerned 
about a particular individual. However, the actors behind 
the mentoring schemes (Ministry of Integration, local po-
lice, and municipality offices of integration) are still 
struggling to find out how to match mentors and mentees 
in a meaningful way, and how to make adolescents who 
are beginning to define themselves in opposition to main-
stream society engage in a relationship with mentors who 
to some extent represent the society and system they are 
opposing.
The second, and similar, example of a policy measure that 
builds on a rationale of governance through individual 
support and response is the attempt to implement radical-
ization as a “new parameter of concern” within the existing 
context of “School – Social services – Police” (SSP) col-
laboration. This institutionalized collaboration has tradi-
tionally been concerned with crime prevention and 
alcohol/drug abuse. The concrete initiative is designed to 
train school teachers to identify signs of radicalization, 
understand radicalization processes, and initiate early in-
tervention either by holding a meeting with the specific 
student and his/her teachers and family, or by contacting 
the authorities, for example through the mentoring pro-
gram. However, the initiative has met some initial resis-
tance among some school teachers who did not believe it to 
be their task to “spot potential terrorists” (Kühle and Lin-
dekilde 2010). Likewise, they believe that there are import-
ant differences between worrying about youth delinquency 
and radicalization, with the latter treated as a problem with 
more political undertones.
1.2.2. Governance through Information and Knowledge
A different set of initiatives aims at providing adolescents 
with information and knowledge about radicalization, 
democracy, and citizenship. The rationale is that in-
formation about possibilities of democratic inclusion and 
active citizenship will prepare adolescents to make the 
“right” choices regarding identity formation and channel-
ing of frustrations. The assumption seems to be that if the 
supply of information targeting young people is optimized 
and made “factual,” attitudes and behaviors can be 
changed. A range of initiatives fall in this category, includ-
ing the creation of an “internet forum for young people on 
democracy and radicalization”; “inspirational material on 
democracy and civic education in Danish public schools”; 
“lessons in democracy and civic citizenship in the indepen-
dent primary schools”; “increased dialogue and in-
formation on the Danish foreign policy”; “strengthened 
training in democracy and civic citizenship in the Danish 
Language Education for adult foreigners” (Regeringen 
2009). It is obvious that several of these initiatives are de-
3 This categorization of policy measures draws 
upon Kjærgaard and Larsen 2010.
IJCV : Vol. 6 (1) 2012, pp. 109 – 125
Lasse Lindekilde: Neo-liberal Governing of “Radicals” 115
signed to target information flows involving, particularly, 
young Muslims in Danish society. It is also clear from the 
descriptions of the initiatives that the information flow will 
mostly be one-way – from authorities to radicalization-
threatened adolescents. Thus, rather than a two-way ex-
change of views, most initiatives in this category build on 
monological attempts to persuade and change perceptions 
in the target group.
One particular initiative in this category has fostered in-
tense public debate, namely the initiative to carry out extra 
inspection visits to twenty-five selected independent pri-
mary schools to ensure that they live up to their responsi-
bility to prepare the students for living in a society with 
freedom and democracy. The controversy concerns both 
the selection of schools and the actual visits. So far ten in-
spection visits have been carried out. It has been pointed 
out, especially by the Association of Danish Independent 
Schools, that the formulated selection criteria seem quite 
arbitrary. Of the ten schools selected so far half had pre-
dominantly Muslim students and were based in residential 
areas with a high percentage of foreigners and citizens with 
a Muslim background. Considering that Muslim indepen-
dent schools make up only about 5 percent of all Danish 
independent schools, the Association of Danish Indepen-
dent Schools and others argue that the inspections were de-
signed from the outset to check Muslim independent 
schools, and that this is highly discriminatory. A head-
master from a Catholic school that was also selected for in-
vestigation argued against this background that his school 
served as an “alibi” in the authorities’ crackdown on Mus-
lim schools (Kjærgaard and Larsen 2010).
1.2.3. Governance through Empowerment
A third set of initiatives in the action plan aims to em-
power target groups to solve their own problems by en-
hancing competences and abilities. A central concern is to 
boost “democratic competences” as a way to make adoles-
cents abstain from choosing radical identities and milieus. 
The basic idea seems to be that by helping target groups 
become aware of possibilities of citizenship and democratic 
engagement, the breeding ground of radicalization will be 
reduced and target groups better equipped to solve prob-
lems of radicalization.
Concretely, the action plan seeks to enhance “democratic 
competences” by funding special “associational mentors” 
who can further the creation of cultural, sports, and leisure 
associations building on democratic principles among ado-
lescents with multicultural backgrounds. Another example 
is funding and creation of “citizenship centers” aiming to 
“strengthen young people’s development of identity, sense 
of belonging, responsibility, civic citizenship and demo-
cratic competencies” (Regeringen 2009, 19–20) by provid-
ing information and guidance on “active citizenship”. A 
final example concerns the initiative to create a “demo-
cratic platform for young people,” especially those with a 
multicultural background. The idea is that adolescents 
from immigrant communities who are engaged in as-
sociations or networks that take part in democracy and in-
tercultural activities can help empower young people with 
multicultural backgrounds who feel excluded from the 
democratic community.
1.2.4. Governance through Surveillance and Intervention
Despite the dominance of neo-liberal logics of governance 
in the Danish action plan to prevent radicalization, a few 
initiatives seem to be based on more conventional modes of 
regulation through control, surveillance, and intervention.
This is the case for some of the initiatives targeting “vul-
nerable residential areas” (Regeringen 2009, 22) and the 
prison system. In vulnerable residential areas, for example, 
the government action plan intervenes in local housing as-
sociations’ letting practices by pushing for more mixed let-
ting in these areas, giving priority to “resourceful tenants” 
over “long-term recipients of cash benefits, start-up assist-
ance or introduction benefits” (Regeringen 2009, 23). In 
the prison system the action plan to prevent radicalization 
forces prisons to adopt a new approval scheme for prison 
chaplains, designed to ensure that approved chaplains are 
fully aware of their responsibility to help prevent radical-
ization.
However, the most significant initiative under this heading 
is the increased use of “preventive talks” conducted by the 
Danish Security and Intelligence Service with adolescents 
who have shown signs of early radicalization or are af-
filiated with extremist milieus. The use of preventive talks 
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builds on a logic of internalization of surveillance by mak-
ing people aware that they are being watched. The Danish 
Security and Intelligence Service is currently designing a 
concept for these preventive talks and methods to screen 
out individuals in the early stages of radicalization.
1.2.5. Governance through Anti-Discrimination
Of the twenty-two initiatives in the action plan, twenty-
one are covered by the above-mentioned four rationales of 
governance. The last strategy, of governance through anti-
discrimination, comprises only one initiative and is rather 
an outlier in the action plan. The initiative is rather un-
developed and stipulates only a need to provide better in-
formation on how to achieve justice after suffering 
discrimination, strengthened activities against dis-
crimination in nightlife, and anti-discrimination measures 
addressing the unfair allocation of vocational traineeships. 
Given that experiences of discrimination are cited as a po-
tential cause of radicalization in the Danish government 
action plan, this shows that discrimination is targeted in 
order to indirectly prevent radicalization. Thus, anti-dis-
crimination is not only pursued as a good in its own right.
As already indicated, the practice regime of radicalization 
prevention can be seen as situated between a practice re-
gime of security and one of integration, tolerance, and citi-
zenship. The influence of and connection with the practice 
regime of integration, tolerance, and citizenship are par-
ticularly clear in connection with the initiatives on anti-
discrimination. The particular initiative of 
anti-discrimination clearly originates there. Following 
Joppke we can say that this particular initiative draws on a 
more Rawlsian notion of liberalism, which is more accept-
ing and accommodating of cultural difference than the dis-
ciplining and correcting notion of Foucauldian liberalism, 
which is dominant in the Danish action plan.
1.3. Implementation – Theory and Practice
The Danish action plan to prevent radicalization is cur-
rently being implemented. A state-sponsored status report 
on the progress of implementation concludes (in October 
2010) that “most initiatives have been launched, and a few 
already finalized” (Cowi 2010, 4). However, several ini-
tiatives are still only words on paper, including a number 
designed to advance feelings of inclusion in the democratic 
community among ethnic minorities. The largest progress 
has been made with the initiatives targeting specific indi-
viduals in the earliest stages of a radicalization process.
If we turn to the concrete instruments, techniques, pro-
cedures, and institutions that are to implement the govern-
ment action plan in practice, two observations are worth 
mentioning. The first point to note is the variety of in-
struments and techniques brought into play, spanning in-
formational campaigning, education of street-level 
bureaucrats, production of handbooks, support of associ-
ational activities, mentoring programs, role models, school 
inspections, etc. The actors involved in the implementation 
process include school teachers, local police, the Danish Se-
curity and Intelligence Service, parents, municipalities, 
young people with a multicultural background, social 
workers, youth club employees, etc. It is clear that this very 
broad coalition-building calls for intense collaboration, 
division of labor, and adjustment of criteria of success 
(Lindekilde and Fahmi 2011). It is far from obvious that all 
these different actors share the understanding of the prob-
lem and solutions envisioned in the government action 
plan – a point which is further developed below.
Second, implementation of many of the initiatives in the 
action plan is connected to existing instruments and in-
stitutions known and used in other practice regimes. For 
example, the aforementioned extra inspection visits to se-
lected independent schools are linked to the inspection and 
control obligations that the Ministry of Education already 
has vis-à-vis Danish independent schools according to the 
Independent Schools Act. Likewise, within the existing 
School/Social services/Police framework radicalization is 
implemented as a new “parameter of concern” alongside 
existing ones of alcohol/drug abuse, criminality, suicidal 
tendencies, eating disorders, etc. This importing or re-em-
bedding of existing technologies of governance is also 
clearly present in the mentor corps and role model 
schemes, which have been widely used in other Danish 
practice regimes, not least in the field of integration.
This “reinvention” of instruments and techniques builds 
on a logic of cost minimization and regulation efficiency 
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maximization. As many of the techniques and institutional 
frameworks have proven effective in other areas of govern-
ance, the basic assumption is that they will be easy to reuse 
and effective in the field of radicalization. However, from a 
governmentality perspective one would also assume that 
the particular area of governance – and its understanding 
of problem and solution – will affect the efficiency of tech-
niques. Thus, one can ask what happens to existing in-
struments when they are either imported to a new practice 
regime or loaded with new objectives. For example, how 
can a role model scheme be meaningfully imported into 
the field of radicalization prevention? Or what happens to 
the understanding of intentions when standard anti-dis-
crimination measures are presented in the context of rad-
icalization prevention? These questions are addressed in 
section two below.
1.4. Identities and Subject Positions
The last dimension of the policy analysis takes a closer look 
at how the action plan creates certain favorable identities 
and how identity formation is directed. We can say that 
where the three first dimensions of the analysis are con-
cerned primarily with the means of governance in the area 
of radicalization prevention, this last dimension is con-
cerned with the end goal of governance: forming the 
“right” kind of people.
A particular concept of the “ideal citizen” permeates the 
action plan. This identity can be summarized as the re-
sponsible, liberal citizen, who is perceived as the natural 
starting point for identity formation in liberal societies. 
Radicalization is, from this perspective, the move away 
from this natural starting point towards alternative 
(negative) identities. The ideal citizen of the action plan is 
first and foremost pro-democratic and non-violent, and 
non-supportive/non-sympathetic vis-à-vis violent or un-
democratic groups. In addition, the ideal citizen is respon-
sible and active. In several parts of the action plan active 
citizenship, in terms of participation in associational life 
and democratic procedures, is praised as an important as-
pect of citizenship. Becoming such an active citizen who 
contributes to the common good is framed in the action 
plan as an individual responsibility. Thus, ideal citizens not 
only oppose violent and undemocratic methods, they also 
play an active and responsible part in society. Finally, the 
action plan stipulates workforce integration as essential to 
the identity of a responsible, liberal citizen. This ideal iden-
tity created in the action plan has much in common with 
the kind of liberal citizens that Joppke identifies as the end 
goal of civic integration policies in Europe.
In opposition to this ideal citizen, the action plan situates 
“the radical,” “the extremist,” or the adolescent “threaten-
ed by radicalization.” This individual has undergone, or is 
undergoing, a process which destroys the normal, natural 
and liberal starting point of identity formation. In this 
perspective the move away from the liberal ideal identity is 
due to the individual’s lack of necessary resources, abil-
ities, and competences to seize the opportunities offered by 
liberal-democratic society. The empowerment logic de-
scribed above underlines this understanding of identity 
formation. In many ways the “radical” is characterized by 
the negation of traits of the responsible, liberal citizen, for 
example by being violent, undemocratic, and inactive. The 
action plan makes several links between living in “parallel 
societies,” isolation from mainstream society, and this 
negative identity.
The action plan to prevent radicalization is, in short, all 
about formation of responsible, liberal citizens at the ex-
pense of “radical” identities, and the two fundamental sub-
ject positions are understood in terms of either-or. Either 
you take on the liberal identity, or you take on a radical 
identity and become the target of corrective policies of in-
tervention. This perception leaves little room for, for 
example, verbally supporting violent groups like Hamas or 
al-Shabaab and at the same time being a responsible, lib-
eral citizen.
2. Potential Iatrogenic Effects of Radicalization Prevention Policies?
After highlighting the intended consequences and the 
underlying rationale and logics of change within the devel-
oping practice regime of radicalization prevention in Den-
mark, we now turn to a theoretical and empirical 
discussion of potential perversion of intentions and con-
sequences when moving from policy formulations to policy 
delivery vis-à-vis target groups (Boudon 1982). It is a fair 
assumption, based on the vast literature of policy studies 
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(for example Hogwood and Lewis 1993), that the con-
sequences of radicalization prevention in practice will de-
pend partly on its implementation – the way policies are 
put to work and presented to citizens by “street level 
bureaucrats” (Lipsky 1980). Likewise, the efficiency of any 
policy depends partly on the target group’s perception of 
the policy’s legitimacy/illegitimacy (Winter and Lehman 
Nielsen 2008). This section addresses Muslims’ perceptions 
and evaluations of radicalization prevention policies: How 
are the problem definition and solution strategy suggested 
by the practice regime of radicalization prevention evalu-
ated by target group members? How is the neo-liberal 
strategy of disciplining into liberal-democratic citizens per-
ceived in practice? How are policy intentions behind spe-
cific initiatives of radicalization prevention understood and 
decoded? The question whether there is any theoretical and 
empirical evidence that radicalization prevention policies 
might have iatrogenic effects in practice is of specific inter-
est.
The aforementioned empirical research among young neo-
orthodox Muslims in the city of Aarhus, Denmark, forms 
the basis of the discussion. The study at large empirically 
investigated the usefulness of the terminology of radical-
ization in identifying and combating potential risks. The 
study applied the definition provided by the Danish gov-
ernment in its action plan to prevent and radicalization, 
and compared it with the political and religious beliefs, 
perceptions, and distinctions articulated in the concrete 
Muslim milieu. The study sought, by comparing the ma-
jority “etic” categories of the radicalization discourse (rep-
resenting the cultural understandings of the professional 
policymaking and academic outsiders) with the “emic” 
categories (representing the cultural understandings of the 
target groups), to clarify the boundaries of radicalization 
and define the term more precisely. In addition, the study 
examined how young Muslims in the target group of the 
radicalization prevention policies evaluated the new action 
plan. Such evaluations were discussed in depth in seven-
teen interviews with Muslims in the study. This part of the 
study soon showed that the vast majority of our inter-
viewees were surprisingly well informed about the policy 
initiatives and quite critical of their design and potential 
effects (negative evaluations were expressed in fifteen of 
the seventeen interviews). To be fair, a few interviewees 
were broadly positive towards the government action plan, 
and thought it was a necessary move. In particular, the 
ideas of improving anti-discrimination efforts were ap-
plauded. Another group of interviewees approved of the 
radicalization prevention plans, but believed they would 
have minimal effect, if any at all. One said “this is fine, but 
it is like curing cancer with Aspirins” (Muhammad, Soma-
li, age 19). In the following, interview statements that sug-
gested more negative perceptions and effects of the policies 
are analyzed and linked with relevant theoretical perspec-
tives. I choose to focus on these negative evaluations as 
they were by far the most frequent in our interviews and 
because they are the most worrisome from a societal or 
policy-making perspective. The nine different Muslim in-
terviewees quoted in the following are all men from immi-
grant backgrounds (although eight Muslim women were 
interviewed for the larger study), with ages ranging from 
nineteen to thirty-eight, and different educational back-
grounds. Most were students of some kind, but the sample 
also included private and public sector employees and un-
employed individuals.
2.1. Policy-learning, Labeling and Suspect Communities
The first theoretical perspective I will apply to the em-
pirical material is a tradition in policy studies that is con-
cerned with the self-image that specific target groups 
“learn” from the framing of certain problems and the labe-
ling of groups in policy texts and implementation practices 
(Soss 1999; Schneider and Ingram 1993). Framing and 
labeling – in this case the label “radical Muslim” – con-
structs a particular understanding of the problem that 
legitimizes policy initiatives (see above). Studies in this 
tradition show how affected target groups can react to im-
posed labels that are perceived as stigmatizing, either by 
opposing them or by gradually subscribing to them (Mon-
crieffe 2007). The effect in terms of behavior is that policies 
do not have the intended consequences.
One particular way that policy framing and labels can lead 
to stigmatization and iatrogenic effects is by obscuring the 
diversity of interpretations and divisions that may be criti-
cal for addressing the very problem or cases that the label 
highlights (Balchin 2007). In our interviews this was a 
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common criticism of the way the term “radical Muslim” is 
defined and addressed in the Danish government’s action 
plan. Two quotes exemplify this reasoning and the poten-
tial effects:
The effect is that you become tired. When you generalize things 
many who are unaffected become affected. It is a very degrading 
feeling. The result is that some begin to isolate themselves more 
– to go against this. (Jamaal, Palestinian, age 28)
The problem lies in the foundation of society, in the basic struc-
tures, in the lack of understanding of Muslim culture. There is a 
need for much more widespread understanding of the fact that 
there is no necessary link between being a practicing Muslim, 
even an orthodox Muslim, and radicalization. It is just not that 
simple. We need much more nuances. But when you see the 
other as an enemy there is no room for nuances. One can come 
up with as many initiatives to combat radicalization as one likes, 
but as long as this basic fact is not understood their effect will be 
minimal. And this will take time” (Taamir, imam, age 32)
The two quotes touch upon how the label “radical Mus-
lim,” as defined in government policy, is believed to be too 
broad and inclusive, and incapable of drawing necessary 
distinctions. More precisely, the widespread perception was 
that by making support of “terrorist organization” like 
Hamas and al-Shabaab, and undemocratic opinions or 
practices (such as unwillingness to participate in demo-
cratic elections) part of the definition of “radicalization,” 
the Danish government is de facto labeling large parts of 
the Danish Muslim population as “radicals.” Further, it was 
argued that such support and opinions represented the ex-
ercise of constitutionally protected free speech and free-
dom of religion, and did not pose any danger to Danish 
society in terms of violence.
The effect of the perceived gross generalization implied by 
the label “radical Muslim” is that it casts suspicion on all 
Muslims:
If I was somebody who did not often meet Muslims I might see 
these initiatives as a sign that we need to keep an eye on all Mus-
lims … We are creating a disproportionate surveillance society. It 
will create distance and then we have a problem. I don’t think 
any parallel societies exist today in Denmark, but this would 
mean that they would develop. I would not trust anybody from 
the authorities. If my seven year-old daughter starts wearing the 
headscarf, am I then a potential radical who needs to be kept un-
der surveillance? (Naadir, Pakistani, age 24)
If the general Danish population does not calm down concer-
ning coexistence with ethnic groups, with Muslims, and stop fo-
cusing on them as a potential threat and constantly being on 
guard with suspicion and exaggerations, then the radicalization 
prevention plan will fail. The action plan itself talks about the 
importance of demystification and communication, acceptance 
and inclusion, but where are we to find the ingredients, if not 
among ordinary Danes. (Taamir, imam, age 32)
In line with recent studies on the effects of “hard” 
counter-terrorism efforts in Western Europe (Schiffauer 
2008, Mythen, Walklate and Khaan 2009; Pantazis and 
Pemberton 2009), the data from our study suggests that 
the labeling and framing of “soft” radicalization pre-
vention policies are creating feelings among Muslims of 
being treated as a “suspect community.” The quotes dem-
onstrate how such generalized suspicion from the sur-
rounding society may lead Muslims to react with isolation 
and suspicion of majority authorities. On the level of 
everyday life Gabe Mythen and his collaborators show how 
the creation of Muslims as a “suspect community” has 
very real effects, making young British Muslims “perform 
safety” in public places for example by not carrying back-
packs in the London underground (Mythen, Walklate and 
Khan 2009, 747).
The power of labeling seems real in many ways. Another 
common effect of policy framing and labeling is that it di-
rects the focus toward particular problems and solutions, 
to the exclusion of others that may be equally salient. Thus, 
the entire practice regime of radicalization prevention, 
along with the intense public debate about radical Islam, 
works to connect the Muslim community to the phenom-
enon of radicalization. As shown in the policy analysis in 
the previous section, this focus means that other problems 
of lacking integration, socio-economic ghettoization, and 
discrimination are subsumed under the heading of radical-
ization prevention. Two quotes illustrate the problematic 
nature of this simultaneous highlighting and over-
shadowing of issues:
I think this extreme focus on radicalization will fail and at some 
point the authorities will do their own evaluations and see that 
these initiatives had very little effect, if any. They will realize that 
they are still left with a lot of other and more pressing issues and 
problems that have not been solved because of the focus on radi-
calization. (Umar, Somali, age 28)
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All these soft measures in the government action plan are fine, if 
only they had not appeared in an action plan to combat radicali-
zation. There is a need for more focus on democratic values, a 
need for more dialogue and knowledge. But when it comes in 
this context I think it is problematic. (Naadir, Pakistani, age 24)
The last quote points to an interesting dilemma that sur-
faced again and again in our interviews: Muslims in the 
target group generally accept the liberal ambition of push-
ing certain democratic values, active citizenship, dialogue, 
anti-discrimination, socio-economic integration, etc., but 
resist the idea of pushing these issues under the heading of 
preventing radicalization. The general perception was that 
these issues deserved attention in their own right and not 
merely as components of the radicalization problem. Our 
interviewees found that the good intentions behind the 
move to address these issues were clouded by way the is-
sues were framed and addressed only as causal factors of 
radicalization.
2.2. Misrecognition and Muslim Identity Strategies
It has already been hinted that the framing and labeling in-
herent in the Danish radicalization prevention policy are 
perceived as degrading, discriminatory, and stigmatizing by 
the young Muslims in our study. These findings can be ex-
plored further by linking them to theories of recognition. 
Stigmatization is a form of misrecognition, which theories 
of recognition, as formulated by Charles Taylor and Axal 
Honneth (Taylor 1994; Honneth 2006), would predict had 
consequences in terms of identity building. The starting 
point for these theoretical perspectives is that recognition 
in modern societies is something that is created and ne-
gotiated socially, and no longer something that flows auto-
matically from one’s position in social hierarchies. Thus, 
recognition of identity as individually and collectively valu-
able can be denied by the surrounding society. This can be 
problematic as recognition is perceived to be a necessary 
condition for being oneself, for personal integrity, and for 
possibilities of achieving the good life. According to Taylor, 
recognition is “not just a courtesy we owe people. It is a 
vital human need” (1994, 26). Axel Honneth argues that 
recognition is negotiated in three different spheres – the 
private sphere of relations to family and friends; the legal 
sphere that concerns the individual’s juridical rights and 
duties; and the sphere of solidarity, which pertains to the 
collectives the individual belongs to (e.g. political, ethnic, 
or religious) (2006, 93). Recognition in the sphere of soli-
darity, which is the most relevant here, is conditional on an 
evaluation of particular groups or identities as con-
tributing to the common good of society. Thus, to realize 
one’s full potential and become a valued citizen in a plural-
istic society it is not enough to gain respect within one’s 
own group or minority; it takes recognition from society at 
large (Anderson 2005: xvii). Taylor describes the con-
sequences of misrecognition of identities by society:
Our identity is partly shaped by recognition or its absence, often 
by the misrecognition of others, and so a person or group of 
people can suffer real damage, real distortion, if the people or so-
ciety around them mirror back to them a confining or demea-
ning or contemptible picture of themselves. Nonrecognition or 
misrecognition can inflict harm, can be a form of oppression, 
imprisoning someone in a false, distorted, and reduced mode of 
being. (1994, 25)
Experiences of misrecognition in the sphere of solidarity, 
for example communicated through stigmatizing labeling 
in public policies, can lead individuals into identity crisis. 
Honneth underlines how the loss of dignity and self-
respect can only be rectified through action, for example 
through protest, continuing the fight for recognition, or 
searching for recognition in alternative collectives (2006, 
181). Honneth, thus, implies that there is a connection be-
tween political resistance/protest, including radical political 
opposition, and experiences of misrecognition.
Such a link between perceived misrecognition in the gen-
eral framing and labeling of Muslims in the Danish action 
plan and different identity strategies was often indicated in 
our interviews . One interviewee said:
The young become tired of this generalized depiction of them – 
in policies and in the media. Through my work I experience first 
hand how many choose to go abroad to look for work because 
they cannot stand hearing it anymore. This has gone on for years 
now, and the debate about radicalization is just adding another 
layer. . . . The focus is always on the very few that have a problem 
with democracy, such as Hizb ut-Tahrir. The focus is entirely on 
all negative. And the broader group of Muslims pays the price. 
All those young people with a Muslim background who are in-
volved in the education system are good and sensible young peo-
ple. What does radicalization have to do with them? They bec-
ome very tired of it all. (Majid, consultant, age 38)
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Here the reaction to misrecognizing generalizations is one 
of exit from majority society, and simply looking abroad 
for better life chances and recognition. Faced with mis-
recognition from Danish society, young Muslims of immi-
grant descent are giving up “Danish Muslim” identities and 
looking to find respect, for example, in Muslim majority 
countries abroad.
Another response strategy would be to downplay the el-
ements of identity that are being misrecognized, here 
Islam, for example by avoiding visual markers of religion, 
and assimilating into “Western culture” and norms of pri-
vatizing religion. This strategy can be found among seg-
ments of the Danish Muslim population who identify as 
“cultural Muslims.” However, to our interviewees, who 
were very orthodox, Salafi-inspired Muslims, this option 
seemed untenable. On the contrary, several interviewees 
suggested that experiences of misrecognition lead young 
Muslims to strengthen their Muslim identity:
What happens when young Muslims are confronted with this is 
that they are confirmed in the feeling that they are a problem – 
that they are under suspicion. This confrontation means that they 
become even more aware of their Muslim identity, as they feel 
stepped upon. This can be the seed for a negative reaction among 
some, a rollback of understanding. (Taamir, imam, age 32)
Rather than leading to exit or assimilation, in this context 
misrecognition is held to produce demonstrative voicing 
and display of difference. The idea expressed in the quote, 
that misrecognition and assimilation pressure may have 
unintended consequences among young Muslims in the 
West struggling to balance between two (or more) cul-
tures, has been identified in other studies as well (for 
example Mythen, Walklate and Khan 2009; Schiffauer 
2007; Roy 2007). In fact, it has been suggested that such 
experiences of misrecognition have fed into the re-
Islamification of young Muslims across Europe over the 
last decade.
A final reactionary strategy implies not just a demon-
strative display of difference, but the creation of actual op-
positional identities, where young Muslims come together 
to define themselves in opposition to majority society. 
They construct an identity around the very misrecognition 
of the society that misrecognizes them. This identity strat-
egy is obviously the most worrying from a perspective of 
radicalization prevention, as the theory suggests that this 
kind of oppositional identity building on a division of the 
world into “us” and “them” forms part of the breeding 
ground for radicalization. Commenting upon the initiative 
in the Danish action plan to make school teachers and so-
cial workers more aware of the signs of radicalization, one 
interviewee states:
Imagine a social worker who has no knowledge of a person’s 
background, and very little knowledge about what it is to be a 
Muslim, who is then told to evaluate whether a person or a fami-
ly shows signs of radicalization. I cannot in my wildest dreams 
imagine how a few courses will enable such a person to make this 
evaluation. I cannot see how such a situation where they are told 
to evaluate people’s thoughts, opinions, dress, and reactions can 
lead to anything good. The effect will be negative, there will be a 
counter-reaction. Already a lot of Muslims believe that the au-
thorities operate on the basis of stereotypes and prejudice. Trust 
is already low. (Jamaal, Palestinian, age 28)
The quote implies that implementation of this initiative 
could have iatrogenic effects by further reducing Muslim 
trust in authorities and in the worst case scenario lead 
young Muslims to isolate from majority society and ac-
tively discredit authorities.
If we look at our interviewees’ evaluations of the different 
types of neo-liberal governance in the Danish radical-
ization action plan an interesting pattern appears. As al-
ready indicated, most interviewees are positive towards 
“governance through anti-discrimination,” although sev-
eral would prefer the government to have addressed the 
problem outside of the practice regime of radicalization 
prevention. Likewise, most interviewees are mildly positive 
or indifferent towards “governance through empower-
ment,” as they welcome efforts to foster and strengthen 
cultural/religious dialogue and organization-building. In-
terestingly, several interviewees explicitly expressed positive 
evaluations of “governance through surveillance and inter-
ference,” specifically the increased use of “preventive talks” 
by the Danish Security and Intelligence Service. As long as 
such preventive talks are conducted in the light of a con-
crete suspicion of terrorist activities, the interviewees wel-
comed it as a necessary instrument. One said:
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I have met several young people where I think such a talk would 
have had a positive effect. However, the effect depends on who is 
doing the talk – it should not be the frightened social worker, but 
the police. And it is essential that this does not become a slippery 
slope where everybody who takes their shoes off to go into the 
mosque needs a preventive talk. For this to work we have to be 
very careful with the techniques that are used and the kind of 
presumptions that we bring to such talks. (Kareem, age 22)
However, the vast majority of young Muslims in our study 
protested against the “governance through individual sup-
port and response” initiatives, in particular the role model/
mentoring schemes and the idea of making radicalization a 
new parameter of concern in the existing preventive 
School/Social services/Policecollaboration. Commenting 
on the role model campaigns, one interviewee said:
I am so tired of role model campaigns. It has become a religion, 
you see. And some people have made a fortune from these role 
models. What this obsession with role model campaigns says is: 
“There are few role models among Muslims in Denmark, but 
large criminal networks.” That is not true – this is not what the 
real picture looks like. It is very discriminatory. (Racheed, age 
27)
The implicit message of role model campaigns is seen as 
discriminatory against the target groups, as it suggests that 
these groups (i.e. young Muslims) are in particular need of 
role models. It is thus perceived as communicating mis-
recognition. Another interviewee argues:
The idea behind the mentor campaigns and role models is that if 
we make some immigrants have contact to some Danes, the im-
migrants cannot help but become a little bit more Danish, that 
is, a little bit better. I am not sure that this is the way to solve our 
problems. (Umar, Somali, age 28)
This quote can be read as a critique of the subtle form of 
neo-liberal governmentality – the disciplining and shaping 
of attitudes and behaviors – which quite obviously forms 
the rationale behind this initiative. The interviewee prob-
lematizes the underlying assumption that if young people 
from the target group interact with others who are more in 
contact with mainstream society and liberal-democratic 
values, the radicalization-prone adolescents will alter their 
exercise of freedom in a more productive direction. Like-
wise, the logic behind “governance through information 
and knowledge” is criticized for being “propagandistic,” 
and a one-sided attempt to persuade and change per-
ceptions in the target group. One interviewee argues that 
these initiatives are designed to “stuff liberal values down 
our throats” (Muhammad, age 25). The general point here 
is that the good intentions behind these preventive 
measures are perceived as misrecognition, which may have 
iatrogenic effects on Muslim identity-building.
2.3. The Fear of the Label “Radical” – Participating as a Muslim in Public 
Debates and Preventive Collaborations
In January 2011 the Danish branch of Hizb ut-Tahrir held 
a much-debated public meeting in Copenhagen. In a press 
interview the spokesman of the largest Muslim umbrella 
organization in Denmark, Zubair Butt Hussain, said that 
he would like to go to the meeting just to hear what these 
“loonies” had to say, but that he dared not go as he feared 
the argumentative strategy of “guilt by association” that is 
so common in public debates about Islam in Denmark. Put 
differently, Zubair But Hussain feared that he would be la-
beled “radical” just for showing up at the meeting and 
would, as he put it, “spend the rest of his life trying to dis-
tance himself from stoning and violent jihad” (Omar, Feb-
ruary 28, 2011).
This example illustrates the final iatrogenic mechanism of 
the radicalization prevention policies and the radicalization 
discourse in general, and shows that the label “radical” is a 
powerful tool for excommunicating actors in public de-
bates. Assigning the label to Muslims active in public dis-
course discredits them and puts them on the defensive, 
forcing them to answer all kinds of questions about their 
beliefs and values. In fact, it can be argued that Muslim ac-
tors who want to be part of public debate are increasingly 
expected to proactively endorse certain liberal democratic 
values (such as rule of law, freedom of speech, gender 
equality, etc.) and reject others (such as sharia, support of 
violent groups, jihad, etc.) before ever saying anything in 
public. That is, the entry barriers for Muslims in public de-
bate seem to be growing. As one interviewee said:
It has become more difficult to engage in the public debate on 
integration, and now radicalization. One has to sound perfectly 
in tune in order to be accepted. You need to have the right views. 
Many just don’t dare to speak up anymore as they are scared of 
the label “radical.” . . . I never had hesitated to speak up in the 
media, but now I consider it a million times … The situation to-
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day is that all the progressive voices are silent in the public deba-
te. They have left the floor to voices such as Hizb ut-Tahrir. 
(Naadir, Pakistani, age 24)
One consequence of the requirement to endorse and reject 
certain values in order to be a legitimate Muslim voice in 
public debate, and not be excommunicated as “radical,” is 
that it leaves the floor to those who are in fact radicals and 
therefore have nothing to lose by being identified as such. 
The problem with this development is that radical views 
are left unquestioned as alternative voices withdraw from 
public debates:
No one dares to speak their mind. They don’t have the resources 
to confront the wave of criticism that follows. And maybe they gi-
ve up and isolate themselves. This is very crucial. It worries me 
that these voices become silent because it leaves more room for ra-
dical views, which are not questioned. (Majid, consultant, age 38)
The alternative voices alluded to here are those who try to 
balance religious orthodoxy and skepticism of Western cul-
ture and institutions with a clear opposition to violence 
and confrontation. Many interviewees believe these actors 
would constitute an effective alternative to radical groups:
People need to understand that Muslim representatives in public 
debates have to balance on a knife-edge. Danish Muslims have 
many more realities and concerns than the ordinary Dane. They 
care about foreign politics, problems in their home countries. 
Many are critical towards the U.S. As a representative you cannot 
just ignore this. You lose legitimacy. If Muslim representatives are 
to play a role in the fight against radicalization they cannot do so 
on premises laid out by the government or the press. It is a ba-
lance, and these people need room to argue their case in their own 
language without being called radicals. (Taamir, imam, age 32)
The last part of this quote addresses an important point. 
The radicalization discourse has spread the fear of the label 
“radical,” leading Muslim actors who could prove import-
ant allies in the battle against radicalization to withdraw 
from public debates. These actors may pose a challenge in 
terms of integration, as they do not fit the mold of the lib-
eral democratic citizen, but not in terms of security. Such 
Muslim actors, be they local imams, community leaders, or 
influential sheiks, may very well be the best suited to reach 
young Muslims flirting with violent jihadism. But, as indi-
cated by the quote above, they would lose their legitimacy 
if they first had to comply with the premises of the radical-
ization discourse by confirming democratic ideals and dis-
missing principles of sharia. So if the authorities were to 
make use of such actors in the battle against radicalization 
it would mean overlooking intolerant and non-inte-
grationist perspectives for the sake of addressing security 
concerns. So far the Danish authorities have been very re-
luctant to do this.
To sum up, the practice regime of radicalization prevention 
and the radicalization discourse in general are narrowing the 
room for non-integrationist, but non-confrontational, or-
thodox Muslims to participate in public debates or cooper-
ate with the authorities. And this may have iatrogenic effects 
in terms of refuting jihadist rhetoric and reaching to those 
few adolescents who are flirting with violent means. Insist-
ing on dialogue only with those who share “our” fundamen-
tal values and goals could turn out to be counterproductive.
3. Conclusions
The first part of this paper provided a governmentality 
analysis of the Danish action plan to prevent radicalization. 
It investigated the framing of the problem of radicalization, 
the modes of governance suggested as the solutions to the 
problem, the techniques and institutions of im-
plementation as well as the positive/negative subject posi-
tions and labels inherent in policies. It was argued that the 
developing practice regime of radicalization prevention re-
volves around logics of “repressive liberalism,” which holds 
that radical identities can be prevented by shaping and dis-
ciplining adolescents with illiberal and undemocratic be-
liefs into liberal democratic citizens. The basic mode of 
governance here is one of influencing individuals’ exercise 
of free will, not through control and prohibitions but 
through incentives, information, empowerment, and chall-
enging interventions. The analysis showed how the prob-
lem of radicalization is framed as an individual, gradual, 
and both behavioral and cognitive process, which justifies a 
diverse and multifaceted approach to radicalization pre-
vention, aiming at early, individual intervention and 
changing behavior by altering illiberal attitudes, beliefs, 
and values.
The second part of the paper discussed how this policy 
framing, labeling, and mode of governance was received 
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and evaluated by Muslims in the target group. The main 
question addressed here was whether the neo-liberal inten-
tions of radicalization prevention in the government action 
plan are perverted in the process of practical im-
plementation. This question was addressed by analyzing 
data from a large interview-based study of young, ortho-
dox Muslims in Denmark, in combination with insights 
from relevant theoretical perspectives. The analysis 
showed, first, how the label “radical Muslim” in the pre-
ventive policies was perceived as glossing over important 
lines of division within the Muslim target group, thus 
grouping together Muslims who support groups such as 
Hamas and al-Shabaab because they believe they are fight-
ing a legitimate battle in war-like situations, with the very 
few who would support al-Qaeda-inspired terrorism in the 
West. Likewise, the label was perceived as wrongly group-
ing Muslims who would not vote in democratic elections 
for religious reasons with the very few Muslims in the West 
who actively work to undermine democracy. These gen-
eralizations inherent in the definition of the label “radical 
Muslim” were found to contribute to the experience that 
Muslims in general are made into part of a “suspect com-
munity.” Secondly, the analysis showed how the general 
framing and labeling of the practice regime of radical-
ization prevention together with concrete initiatives in the 
action plan were evaluated as communicating misrecog-
nition of Muslims and Islam. The data suggests here that 
experiences of misrecognition may negatively affect Mus-
lim identity strategies, ultimately by fostering oppositional 
Muslim identities. Finally, analysis of the empirical data 
suggested that the spread of the radicalization discourse in 
Denmark has created a fear among Muslim actors of the 
label “radical,” which is used in public debates to effec-
tively excommunicate Muslim actors who are not perfectly 
in tune with the majority’s liberal democratic ideas. It was 
shown how this mechanism has shrunk the latitude in 
public debate and the scope of institutionalized cooper-
ation with the authorities for non-integrationist but non-
confrontational orthodox Muslim actors.
Although the analysis of iatrogenic effects of radicalization 
prevention policies described in this paper is indicative 
rather than strictly causal, I find the evidence worrying. Al-
though the evidence does not suggest that young Muslims 
addressed by a radicalization mentor or critical questions 
from teachers will automatically radicalize further as a con-
sequence of negative labels and experiences of misrecog-
nition, it does suggest that this risk is real, and that 
confrontation with the radicalization discourse could have 
unintended negative effects through more indirect chan-
nels. The data presented here indicates that the risks of 
iatrogenic effects of radicalization prevention are greatest 
in initiatives that are heavily influenced by the logic of “re-
pressive liberalism.” The existence of these risks does not 
mean that we should give up trying to  prevent radical-
ization, but it most certainly should make us think very 
carefully about how to frame, formulate, present, and prac-
tically implement radicalization prevention policies.
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